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Abstract  
Drawing on narrative analysis, this paper analyses the 2013 Fifth Regulatory Review of the license of 
an Australian casino as a case study focused on the framing and articulation of ‘responsible gambling’ 
(RG) in the Review. Part 1 sets out the policy and regulatory context for the licensing review of 
Melbourne’s Crown Casino. Part 2 overviews the structure/content of the Review; the key messages 
of the Reviewers’ narrative and its main recommendations. In reflecting on the Review in Part 3, 
analysis focuses on the investigation and recommendations regarding Responsible Gambling, which 
has gained recent policy priority. The analysis interrogates the Review’s findings, narratives, 
processes and evidentiary base in relation to how it presents and assesses casino performance on RG. 
In doing so, it focuses on the Victorian Commission  for Gambling and Liquor Regulation’s Review’s 
framing of RG; sources of evidence drawn on by the Review; an assessment of  the casino’s loyalty 
club feature ‘Play Safe’, as an RG measure; the Review’s assessment of casino performance on RG 
and its Code of Conduct in particular; and the Review’s framing of RG recommendations. It 
concludes with reflections on governance issues raised by the Review, the need for more focus on the 
neglected area of regulatory licensing and enforcement (OECD, 2011; 2012; OECD & European 
Commission, 2009) and the need for independent regulatory reviews that address conflicts of interest 
on the part of both Government and the Regulator. 
Keywords  
Regulatory Review, regulatory inspections, casinos, responsible gambling, dangerous consumptions, 
electronic gaming machines 
1. Introduction 
Gambling constitutes a site of explicit state regulation as the state decides and negotiates license-to-
operate conditions along with the degree of significance accorded to harmful impacts, regulatory 
monitoring and enforcement, harm prevention and state/operator duty of care. For many years, 
governments eschewed the idea of allowing casinos; or for that matter, gambling machines and casino 
games that were associated with Las Vegas-type organized crime and scandal. Although two of 
Australia’s 13 casinos were opened in the 1970s (Wrest Point in Hobart in 1973 and Sky City in 
Darwin in 1979), it was only in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia, that casinos really took hold; as did 
suburbanized gambling in clubs and 
hotels. But, casinos were treated with 
caution and many States have so far 
allowed only one to be established. In 
selling the idea to communities, 
government rhetoric has been that casinos 
would be regulated to prevent crime, 
conduct gambling honestly, prevent 
minors from gambling and be run with 
transparency, high probity standards, 
integrity and in the public interest. 
State/Territory laws and regulations reflect 
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these core purposes. 
 
State Regulators are charged with the responsibility of monitoring licensee performance and with 
conducting periodic reviews of casinos. They have wide powers as independent statutory authorities. 
While casinos may have first been seen as a means of encouraging tourism, regional development and 
employment,  “responsible gambling” (RG) (with all its ambiguity) superseded “harm minimization” 
to become the new paradigm emphasized in Australia by legislators, regulators and the gambling 
industry since the early 2000s.  As argued later, not only is the RG focus limited, but the interpretation 
of RG has followed conservative lines, emphasizing individual rather than industry responsibility for 
harms.  
 
In contrast, conceptualizing the regulation of gambling and casinos in particular in terms of 
‘dangerous consumptions’, has gained more emphasis nationally  and internationally  in countering 
the individualized focus of RG and the need for a public health harms prevention approach. The key 
message is that dangerous consumptions demand tougher regulation and stricter enforcement than 
more benign products. These new public health approaches challenge vested interests to ‘stop the 
harms’, with more structural reforms that limit the rapacity of products designed to entrap or addict by 
requiring licensed providers to exercise ‘host responsibility’ and a duty of care to their customers . A 
public health up-stream prevention of harms approach has been prompted by questions raised in two 
national Productivity Commission reviews of gambling in1999 and 2010; recent national 
Parliamentary inquiries into gambling (2012/13) and the (failed) national campaign for electronic 
gambling machines to be pulled back to a maximum of $1 per button press with losses capped at $120 
per hour.  
 
In this context, State Regulators bear a hefty responsibility to use their wide discretionary powers to 
regulate gambling, and casinos in particular, as potentially high-risk activities. This needs to be done 
in a manner that upholds public interest and good governance practices within an adaptive regulatory 
response that responds to and reflects research, evidence and community sentiment.  
 
This paper focuses on the 2013 Fifth Regulatory Review of the license of an Australian casino as a 
case study of how a State regulator approaches and conducts a license review of one of the biggest 
casinos in the Southern hemisphere - Crown Casino, Melbourne (CCM) . Drawing on narrative 
analysis, the article focuses on the framing and articulation of ‘responsible gambling’ in the Review. 
The Fifth Review was completed in August 2013 and released/ published on 14 August 2013 , in the 
midst of the federal election campaign and barely rated a mention in the media. All five Reviews have 
been carried out by the Victorian gambling Regulator (previously the VCGA and VCGR); which 
since its launch on the 6th of February 2012, has combined gambling and liquor licensing regulation 
under the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR). 
 
Part 1 of this article sets out the policy and regulatory context for the licensing review and then 
outlines the governance structure of the review process and policy changes since the Fourth casino 
licensing Review in 2008. In Part 2, the analysis of the Fifth Review overviews the structure/content 
of the Review, the key messages of the Reviewers’ narrative and its main recommendations. In 
reflecting on the Review in Part 3, analysis focuses on the investigation and recommendations 
regarding Responsible Gambling, which has gained policy priority since legislated amendments from 
2000 and particularly from 2008 when Codes of Conduct were mandated for all licensees in Victorian 
clubs, hotels and the casino. The analysis interrogates the Review’s findings, narratives, processes and 
evidentiary base in relation to how it presents and assesses casino performance on RG. In doing so, it 
focuses on the VCGLR Review’s framing of RG; sources of evidence drawn on by the Review; the 
Review’s assessment of Play Safe as an RG measure; the Review’s assessment of casino performance 
Journal of Business Systems, Governance and Ethics  Vol 8, No 1         
Page 3 
 
on RG and its Code of Conduct in particular; and the framing of RG recommendations. In the final 
Part 4, it reflects on governance issues raised by the Review and onus on research and policy makers 
to focus on the relatively neglected area of regulatory licensing enforcement (OECD, 2012). Finally, 
regulators and governments need to ensure independence of the review process that ensures freedom 
from conflicts of interest.  
 
2. The Policy and Regulatory Context and the Casino Licensing 
Review Process 
2.1 Policy Context 
Australia’s 13 casinos are governed by casino-specific legislation as well as legislation that applies to 
gambling generally. Under Australia’s federal system, casino licensing is a matter for 
States/Territories, each of which has specific licensing and regulatory authorities set up under specific 
legislation (Allan Consulting, 2009). In most States/Territories casino games are mainly restricted to 
licensed casino premises . Casinos also typically broker numerous concessions from governments and 
exemptions or departures from the rules that prevail in gambling-licensed clubs and hotels . At the 
same time, casinos are regarded as more intensive gambling environments and are subject to stricter 
oversight under dedicated legislation. The larger scale of gambling in casinos compared to smaller 
suburban club and hotel gambling venues means that the risks associated with crime and corruption, 
money laundering, loan sharking and probity are higher; and that such venues are in need of greater 
scrutiny and tighter regulatory oversight.  
In terms of community sentiment, in the 30 or so years since casino gambling was legalised in 
Australia, the public has stayed relatively critical of the impact of gambling; and especially electronic 
gambling machines . A reason for this is recognition of the harms caused by gambling and its negative 
impacts ; articulated clearly by two national inquiries conducted by the Productivity Commission in 
1999 and 2010; a range of national Parliamentary inquiries, debates on gambling in 2012-2013 with 
the Gillard-Wilke Agreement  and numerous State/Territory reports on the social impact of gambling. 
Crown Casino is the largest casino in Australia . It is under an obligation to run a ‘world-class casino’ 
and has been subject to regulatory international benchmarking on its operational practices in this and 
previous Reviews (VCGA 2000, VCGA 2003, VCGR 2008, VCGLR 2013). Crown expresses its 
commitment to being a ‘world leader in responsible gambling practices’ (Crown Melbourne Limited, 
2010, Crown Code, p. 2). A number of features of CCM’s operations merit mention: 
- Special conditions relate to its license to operate (Crown is subject to state laws and casino-specific 
legislation (the Casino Control Act 1991 and the Casino (Management Agreement) Act 1993)  and to 
regulatory reviews by the combined gambling and liquor regulator, the VCGLR. 
- There are regulatory and compliance challenges posed by its size and complexity of operation as an 
‘entertainment complex’. 
- Crown Melbourne Limited is part of a larger transnational corporation (Crown Limited) with two 
casinos in Macau and casino interests in Canada, the US and the UK. Crown Limited Management 
and Board are therefore cogniscent of international differences in regulatory environments and 
presumably, best practice. Crown Limited’s expansion into new Asia Pacific markets in Sri Lanka and 
the Philippines raises issues related to transnational corporate responsibility; in jurisdictions with 
widely recognized probity risks.  
- Location of Crown Casino complex on the Southbank entertainment precinct in close proximity to 
the central business district, raises expectations that ease of public access to such a large venue 
necessitates vigilant regulatory oversight and high standards of internal operations on responsible 
gambling, responsible service of alcohol and security. Governments have embraced industry self-
regulation via Codes of Conduct that are framed in terms of ‘responsible gambling’. But how 
‘responsible’ are casino host responsibility and responsible gambling programs 1.2 How the Review 
process works 
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Reviews of Crown Casino Melbourne are conducted by the Regulator with the four previous Reviews 
conducted by the VCGR and VCGR (VCGA 1997, 2000, 2003; VCGR, 2008) and the Fifth Review 
conducted by the newly merged combined gambling and liquor licensing regulator, the VCGLR. It is 
worthy of note that the VCGLR conducts both ‘extensive day-to-day regulation of casino operations 
and the casino operator, as well as conducting periodic casino Reviews under section 25 of the Casino 
Control Act’ (VCGLR, 2013 p. 11). Reviews were previously three-yearly, changed to up to every 
five years on August 21 2005 . The Fifth Review is the second five-yearly Review, which includes the 
period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2013. Only two Reviews within a decade poses weighty obligations on 
the review body, the VCGLR. 
The formal requirements of the review are stipulated in Section 25 of the Casino Control Act 1991:  
 S 25(1) Not later than 3 years after the commencement of operations in a casino, and thereafter at 
intervals not exceeding 5 years, the Commission must investigate and form an opinion as to each of 
the following matters— 
(a) whether or not the casino operator is a suitable person to continue to hold the casino licence; 
(b) whether or not the casino operator is complying with this Act, the Casino 
(Management Agreement) Act 1993, the Gambling Regulation Act 2003 and the regulations made 
under any of those Acts; 
(c) in the case of the Melbourne Casino Operator, whether or not the casino operator is complying 
with— 
(i) the transaction documents ; and 
(ii) any other agreements between the Melbourne Casino Operator and the State, or a body 
representing the State, that impose obligations on the casino operator in relation to gaming; 
(d) whether or not it is in the public interest that the casino licence should continue in force (Casino 
Control Act, 1991). 
 
In terms of methodology and focus of the Fifth Review: 
The VCGLR has scrutinized Crown Melbourne Limited’s records, systems and outcomes in relation 
to its obligations concerning the conduct of casino operations; the status of the Melbourne Casino; its 
finances and structure; the prevention of criminal activity at the Melbourne Casino; and the welfare of 
patrons, including minimising the harm of problem gambling (VCGLR, 2013 p. 12). 
 
The Review report is presented under headings: Suitability, Compliance with Obligations, Melbourne 
Casino Operations and Recommendations. 
2.2 The shifting policy and regulatory context of the licensing Review 
During the five-year period under review, a number of legislative and policy shifts have occurred in 
Victoria of relevance to regulatory review of the casino. The most significant of these are: 
• December 1, 2008 ban on gambling whilst intoxicated (under provisions of section 81 of the Casino 
Control Act 1991 linked regulatory enforcement of gambling and liquor licensing laws; 
• RG a priority - June 2009 Responsible Gambling Codes of Conduct mandated for implementation in 
clubs, hotels and Crown Casino ; 
• Variations to the license including additional gaming tables licensed at Crown Casino Melbourne 
(CCM) in December 2009 .  
• Concessions granted to Crown Casino in taxation (a high roller taxation rate), and defining 
‘automated table games’ as table games, rather than gambling machines in 2009 .  
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There were also a number of changes to the corporate interests of Crown Limited and its domestic and 
international growth between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2013: 
• Developments at Burswood Casino, Perth ; 
• April 2009 Crown Limited bought shares in Cannery Casino Resorts, Las Vegas;  
• June 2009 City of Dreams casino opened in Macau;  
• April 2010 Crown Metropole Hotel opened at Southbank Melbourne.  
• May 2011 Crown Limited purchased Aspinal’s Club in London. 
• May 2013 NSW regulator approved up to 23 percent stake in Echo Entertainment Group in NSW 
and Queensland regulator approves up to 24.99 percent share. Crown Limited sells its ECHO shares 
in May 2013. 
• 2013 Crown Limited negotiating new casino licences in Sri Lanka and Philippines (VCGLR 
Review, 2013, p. 9). 
• July 4 2013 the NSW Government approved Crown Limited’s bid for a second Sydney casino 
license at the Barangaroo site to proceed to stage 3 of the development process (Nichols, 2013). 
 
3. Analysis of the Fifth Crown Casino Licensing Review 
3.1 Making ‘meaning’ from the narrative of the Fifth licensing Review 
Narrative analysis is drawn upon in analysis of the Review.  As May argues, narrative studies are 
frequently holistic in nature and focus on the ‘sequencing of themes within narratives’, focus on both 
form and content and present findings in the form of case studies’ (May n.d.). Social scientists draw 
attention to the role of narrative in story-telling and in reinforcing particular power and interest 
relations (May, n.d; May 2008; McBeth 2005). Narrative review is multi-disciplinary and its 
legitimacy for the study of public/policy documents is well established (Feldman et al., 2004; May, 
n.d; Reissman, 2008). Narrative method draws attention to the constructed nature of how narratives 
are selective, how they include and exclude particular groups and interpretations, sanction certain 
forms of knowledge and construct social identities (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2008: 382) and 
reflect power inequalities in how processes are legally framed and how narrative is constructed to 
achieve social consequences (Pedriana, 2006; Squire et al., 2008: 4). Narrative analysis is used here in 
the context of public reporting as a form of story-telling that is ultimately selective and reflective of 
certain power relations.  
Narrative analysis can be used to examine how narratives both reflect and shape social contexts. How 
collective narratives reflect power relations whose narratives ‘stick’ and why, whose narratives are 
excluded, and what the effects of this are (May n.d.). 
The purpose of narrative analysis is agreed in terms of being an interpretive research approach aimed 
at discovering underlying meaning and the construction of realty, where language is analysed as 
instrumental and related to power structures and how they work to reinforce certain structural 
interests. As outlined below, narrative analysis focuses on ‘meaning making’.  
The current popularity of narrative analysis is largely due to the ‘narrative’ or ‘linguistic’ turn in the 
social sciences. This has brought about a renewed interest in the role that language plays in social 
interaction and society: language is not neutral but rather is a means to accomplish social ends and is 
thus implicated in structures of power. Such an interpretive approach does not seek to analyse 
narratives in order to access underlying events but rather focuses on meaning making. Much of 
narrative analysis is based on the notion that how experiences are reconstructed and interpreted is 
important in itself (University of Manchester, 2013). 
 
Journal of Business Systems, Governance and Ethics  Vol 8, No 1         
Page 6 
 
3.2 The Fifth Crown Casino License Review – constructing a narrative for positive    
review 
The structure/content of the Review 
The Review is described by the Regulator as ‘largely a compliance review’ but one that is shaped by 
VCGLR’s  ‘assessment of the key regulatory risks’ associated with ‘the changing international and 
local casino environment and regulatory obligations that may not align with the casino operator’s 
commercial incentives’ (VCGLR, 2013 p. 11). The Review is structured according to assessments of 
CCM’s suitability to hold the license, compliance with statutory and contractual obligations and in 
terms of its Operations — focused on core gaming functions and security and surveillance. It is 
structured around the four key areas investigated: suitability, compliance with statutory obligations, 
compliance with contractual obligations, and public interest. 
 
Key messages of the Reviews’ narrative  
The report explicitly sets the Review in the context of the rise of Asian gambling markets and shifts in 
the global casino market from the USA to Macau, Singapore and Asia, since the 2008 CCM license 
Review was conducted. It foreshadows significant growth, with PwC estimating the Asian gaming 
market to comprise 43 per cent of the global market by 2015 (VCGR, 2013, p. 10). The Review is 
sympathetic to Crown’s capacity to compete internationally. 
It is important that the operation and management of the Melbourne Casino keeps pace with the 
changing risks and commercial pressures of the international casino market. The VCGLR considers 
that the management team of the Crown Group is acting to meet those challenges (VCGLR, 2013, p. 
10).  
 
The Review is also clear that such trends and Crown’s involvement in the Asian markets, which may 
be less well regulated, poses risks. 
 
Equally, the VCGLR’s regulation of the Melbourne Casino and casino operator must continue to 
evolve to ensure it is attuned to these changing risks and meeting the purposes of Victorian gambling 
legislation (VCGLR, 2013, p. 10).  
 
Key risks include: 
• The financial and probity risks arising from the Crown Group’s significant Australian and 
international expansion plans;  
• The increase in responsible gambling obligations and the potential for these to conflict with 
commercial obligations; and  
• Criminals attempting to engage in illegal activities at the Melbourne Casino (VCGLR, 2013, p. 11-
12). 
 
The Review is also mindful of risk factors related to Crown Ltd.’s involvement in the Macau 
gambling market (33 per cent investment in Melco Crown) in terms of: 
• Any travel restrictions to Macau imposed by the Chinese Government; 
• Further restrictions by the Chinese Government on the movement of money out of China; 
• Melco Crown’s current sub-concession extends until 2022 and there is no guarantee the sub-
concession will be extended beyond this date; and 
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• Relaxation of gaming laws in other regional economies that would compete with the Macau market 
(VCGLR, 2013, p. 71) 
 
Even though from a financial risk point of view, there are protections of CCM: 
The Deed of Cross Guarantee binds the financial position of Crown Melbourne Limited to the other 
Crown Group companies and does not include any of Crown Limited’s international operations, and 
presents a low risk to the short to medium term position of Crown Melbourne Limited (VCGLR, 
2013, p. 71). 
 
The main thrust of arguments in the early part of the Review report is to emphasize the importance of 
expansion into the Asia-Pacific region and Crown Group’s and CCM’s capacity to compete in the 
international VIP market.  
Crown Melbourne Limited’s financial performance and strength is increasingly dependent on the 
prosperity of the VIP market; and given its location in the world, its continued ability to attract 
participants to this market. Revenue and EBITDA growth is fundamental for Crown Limited to 
achieve its expansion plans and is highly dependent on the growth of the commission based player 
market (VCGLR, 2013, p. 71). 
  
3.3 The main recommendations pertaining to the CCM license renewal 
The VCGLR’s opinion under section 25 of the Casino Control Act. Following the VCGLR’s 
investigations and for the reasons set out in this report, the VCGLR has formed the opinion that: 
a. the casino operator, Crown Melbourne Limited remains a suitable person to hold a casino licence;b. 
the casino operator, Crown Melbourne Limited is complying with the Casino Control Act1991, the 
Casino (Management Agreement) Act 1993, the Gambling Regulation Act 2003 and the regulations 
made under any of those Acts; 
c. the casino operator, Crown Melbourne Limited is complying with the transaction documents and 
any other agreements between the Melbourne casino operator and the State, or a body representing the 
State, that impose obligations on the casino operator in relation to gaming; 
d. it is in the public interest that the casino licence should continue in force (VCGLR, 2013, p. 9). 
 
The Review makes ten recommendations with six of these in the area of Responsible Gambling. Other 
recommendations relate to enhancing Crown’s corporate governance arrangements to implement best-
practice auditing, better display of game rules at the casino and an investigation into making them 
available via smart phones (VCGLR, 2013b). 
 
The next section deals in more detail with some elements of the Review’s treatment of Responsible 
Gambling (RG). In the words of the Chair of the Review Commissioner Robbie Kerr, ‘VCGLR 
regulates the casino with a strong emphasis on harm minimisation and responsible gambling,’ 
(VCGLR, 2013b). The Review therefore recognizes the increased importance of RG since the 2008 
Review 
 
4. Responsible Gambling 
Part 3 of the Review focuses on the VCGLR framing of RG; sources of evidence drawn on by the 
Review; assessment of CCM’s loyalty program Play Safe Limits; the Review’s assessment of CCMs 
Code of Conduct performance; and the Review’s RG recommendations.  
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4.1 VCGLR Review’s framing of “RG”;  
CCM approach to RG is focused on a mix of mandated and voluntary measures that are consistently 
described by both the Review and by CCM in its submission (Crown Melbourne Limited, 2012) as 
including: 
• compliance with state government requirements on signage (including information, clocks on 
machines etc.) 
• voluntary establishment of the Customer Support Centre (established as a voluntary commitment in 
2002) and more recently its Chaplaincy Support Service 
• CCM’s establishment of a Responsible Gambling Committee 
• restriction of credit to international players with verified identity as a condition of participation in 
commission based play arrangements (VCGLR, 2013 p. 91) 
• implementation of a self-exclusion process 
• maintenance of a Responsible Gaming Contact Register to record complaints about a patron’s 
gambling by family or friends (VCGLR, 2013, p. 92) 
• the Play Safe Limits program which enables Signature (loyalty) club members  to voluntarily set 
time or spend limits for each session prior to playing the machines on a daily or annual basis 
(VCGLR, 2013, p. 90). This is described by CCM as its ‘voluntary pre-commitment program’ (Crown 
Melborne Limited, 2012). 
• Player activity statements are provided to Crown Signature Club members in accordance with 
requirements related to loyalty programs  
• CCM’s obligations to implement a Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct under 2008 
amendments to the Gambling Regulation Act 2003. 
From a regulatory perspective, RG was approved as a focus for the Regulator’s Reviews of CCM in 
the Third Triennial Review (VCGA, 2003) following legal and regulatory policy changes to 
governing legislation. In its briefing to Hanks QC the VCGA (below) noted the change in legislative 
priorities with the dropping of ‘promoting tourism, employment and economic development generally 
in the State’ from S 140 of the Casino Control Act and the fostering of RG in casinos as a priority (a 
policy re-direction introduced in 2000 by the Bracks government took over from the previous Kennett 
Liberal government): 
(a) ensuring that the management and operation of casinos remains free from criminal influence or 
exploitation; and  
(b) ensuring that gaming and betting in casinos is conducted honestly; and  
 promoting tourism, employment and economic development generally in the State. 
 fostering responsible gambling in casinos in order to— 
(i) minimise harm caused by problem gambling; and  
(ii) accommodate those who gamble without harming themselves or others (VCGA, 2003, p. 33-34, 
policy briefing cited by Hanks QC). 
Under the Third Triennial Review, ‘Responsible gambling was defined as ‘the social and personal 
damage that may be attributable to gambling (VCGA, 2003, p. 5) and was one of the terms of 
reference for the Operational Compliance Subcommittee, including investigating Crown’s 
performance in delivering responsible gambling in the casino and Crown’s responsible gambling 
management, security and service and surveillance’ (Hancock, 2011, p. 129). 
The Fourth 2008 Review placed emphasis on an investigation of ‘gaming activities’ under which it 
included ‘responsible gambling obligations’ . In terms of its key focus on whether or not Crown 
Casino had breached its statutory obligations, the Fourth Review states: 
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The Commission recognises that the comprehensive approach by Crown Melbourne to responsible 
gambling (while there is still room for improvement) makes Crown Melbourne a world leader. 
 
The Commission examined Crown Melbourne’s compliance with relevant harm 
minimisation (responsible gambling) legislation and its corporate approach to the 
provision of problem gambling services, such as counselling services, patron 
exclusion processes, the provision of problem gambling services information and how Crown 
Melbourne informs itself of problem gambling research. 
The examination confirmed that Crown Melbourne has not breached its statutory 
obligations in relation to responsible gambling and Crown Melbourne’s participation in responsible 
gambling working parties and its establishment of complementary programs indicate a commitment to 
deliver its gaming products in a responsible manner (VCGR, 2008, P. 21). 
 
In its Fifth Review VCGLR (2013, p. 81) sees RG as ‘an important element’ of the CCM operations, 
and makes reference to the way that ‘(g)ood responsible gambling practices can ameliorate or prevent 
some of the harms caused by problem gambling. They also demonstrate good management and show 
a commitment to patron welfare.’. They also demonstrate good management and show a commitment 
to patron welfare’ and the increasing importance of RG as reflected in ‘the growing list of obligations 
within the Casino Control Act and the Gambling Regulation Act, designed to protect gamblers from 
harm’ (VCGLR, 2013, p 81). 
 
However, compared to previous Reviews, the Fifth demonstrates a shift in the way RG is framed. In 
terms of its evaluation of CCM performance, the Review frames RG in individual terms rather than in 
the broader remit of operator responsibility, beginning its assessment of CCM performance on RG 
with a reference to Crown’s framing of RG, which also reinforces an individual rather than an 
operator responsibility focus. 
As Crown Melbourne Limited notes in its Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, gaming is enjoyed 
by the vast majority of their customers, but some people have difficulties with gambling responsibly 
and this may cause them, and those around them, harm (VCGLR, 2013, p. 81). 
 
The Review cites a definition of RG obtained from The Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation 
and defines responsible gambling as ‘gambling in a way that is controlled, is within the gambler’s 
financial means and does not interfere with the gambler’s life or the lives of those around them. As 
shown below, this definition has framed the subsequent Review.  
This definition informed the way the VCGLR conducted its investigations and the way the issues 
were approached. In particular, the definition provided context when considering the processes and 
procedures Crown Melbourne Limited uses to meet its responsible gambling obligations (VCGLR, 
2013, p. 82). 
Curiously, the definition used above does not appear from searches of Foundation publications and 
the VCGLR Review does not draw on the major document published by the Responsible Gambling 
Foundation in its Guide to Responsible Gambling, which differentiates what RG means for 
individuals and providers. According to the Foundation: 
For individuals it means: 
• they may gamble for pleasure and entertainment but are aware of their likelihood of losing, and 
understand the associated risks 
• they exercise control over their gambling activity 
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• responsible gambling occurs in balance with other activities in their lives and is not causing 
problems or harm for themselves or others 
 
For providers it requires:  
• shared responsibility for generating awareness of the risks associated with gambling 
• creating and promoting environments that prevent or minimise problem gambling 
• and being responsive to community concerns around gambling (Responsible Gambling Foundation 
n.d. p. 8) 
 
Notably, the elements of importance to providers including host responsibility to prevent harms, are 
not emphasized in the guiding definition adopted by the VCGLR Review; but rather a reverse-onus on 
the patron or customer, urged to control their gambling.  
 
Crown’s Review submission outlines its approach to RG: 
Crown has been committed to Responsible Service of Gaming (RSG) since inception. Crown has led 
the way in RSG initiatives, including Crown’s voluntary 
pre-commitment program (in place since 2003) and its unique array of available 
services comprising dedicated and specially trained staff of RGLOs, RGPs and 
Chaplaincy support, all available from its Responsible Gaming Support Centre 
(RGSC) 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Crown’s initiatives place it at the forefront 
in Australia and arguably the world, in relation to RSG. Crown Signature Club members have access 
to a kiosk facility to view their Player Activity Statements (PAS). Members can sign up for Crown’s 
voluntary precommitment program (named Play Safe Limits), where they can voluntarily nominate 
predetermined time and loss limits (Crown Melbourne Limited (Crown Melbourne Limited), 2012, p. 
7-8). 
 
Crown frames its submission in terms of ‘responsible service of gaming (RSG)’. Such use of language 
focuses on the more benign term ‘gaming’ rather than ‘gambling’ and is not a term usually associated 
with the framing of Responsible Gambling (RG). Two elements of this phraseology merit comment. 
Use of the word ‘gaming’ is ambiguous as it may be taken to encompass gaming that is not gambling, 
i.e., that is not conducted for money and is purely for fun.  Its terminology ‘responsible service of 
gaming’ [ital added] delimits its remit to that of a provider of a service implying the consumer has 
certain opt-in choices, but where its own obligation to provide a safe gambling environment and 
provision of safe gambling products is not acknowledged. Crown Melbourne has a ‘Senior Manager 
Responsible Gaming’ and from 2010 Crown Ltd. set up a Responsible Gaming Committee .  
In accordance with its Charter, the Committee: 
• Monitors and reviews the operation and effectiveness of responsible gambling programs; 
• Recommends responsible gambling policiesand procedures; 
 • Promotes improved responsible gambling practices; and 
• Promotes awareness of responsible gambling (VCGLR, 2013, p. 85). 
The use of language is important in promoting a normalization of gambling by eliding it into 
‘gaming’. Notably, the term ‘Responsible service of gaming’ is used only once in the two-volume 
Productivity Commission (2010, 2010, 12.35) report and that reference is to training programs in 
responsible service of gaming for hotels, clubs and casinos citing the submission of the gambling 
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industry peak body, the Australasian Gaming Council [previously the Australian Gambling Council]. 
This would imply the industry is keen to promote a change in terminology that is in its own interest 
and has had some element of success with the term being embedded in section 58A of the Casino 
Control Act in reference to staff training in an approved Responsible Service of Gaming Course and 
the Review has picked up the term in its heading ‘Responsible service of gaming training’. 
 4.2. Sources of evidence drawn on by the Review, in addition to its own information;  
Data relied on by the Review included Crown Melbourne Limited’s (2012) submission to the VCGLR 
and responses to questions, data from CCM relating to RG procedures and RG surveys it undertook, 
presentations from Crown and a tour of the RG Support Centre, Interviews with Chair of Crown 
Limited’s Responsible Gaming Committee, agendas and minutes, Crown Melbourne Limited and 
Crown Limited committees and the annual reviews conducted by Crown Melbourne Limited of its 
Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, consultations with gambling experts and a third party round 
table including Gambler’s Help counselors, research material from the Victorian Responsible 
Gambling Foundation; responsible gambling initiatives at other casinos; and international gambling 
regulators (VCGLR, 2013, p. 81-82). 
 
In the absence of a formal hearings and longer more inviting submission process, for example, in 
response to a discussion paper or draft report (which were absent from the recent review process), the 
level of detail on whom was consulted, and the thoroughness of the research and consultation process 
is lacking Apart from the public advertisement at the start of a 9-month process, giving a six week 
window to make a submission it is not surprising that the only submission was that of Crown 
Melbourne Limited (and that a similar result pertained to all five reviews so far). This should raise 
questions about the Regulator’s community engagement strategy on casino licensing Reviews and the 
lack transparency on which experts and third parties were consulted and to what extent. In terms of 
the Review drawing on information from within the Regulator, there is a lack of insight into its 
findings drawing on unpublished data from day-to-day monitoring of the casino and matters raised by 
Inspectors and others during the five-year Review period. The Review brings to light the lack of 
transparency of detailed reportage of the inspectorial and enforcement activities of the Regulator. 
4.3 Assessment of Play Safe as RG 
Play Safe, introduced in June 2003, lets members of Crown’s Signature club voluntarily set time and 
spend limits for each session prior to playing EGMs (VCGLR, 2013, p. 90).  PlaySafe Limits is also 
the conduit though which players can opt to play machines in “restricted areas”, that are exempt from 
state government limits on spin rate, note acceptor limits, spin rates, bet limits and payout by check 
that apply to other gambling machines in Crown and to machines in club and hotel venues in Victoria. 
(VCGLR, 2013, p. 90). Once the time or spend limit is reached the ‘machine emits an audible tone 
and displays a written message, explaining that the patron can no longer accrue membership points for 
the Signature Club’ (VCGLR, 2013, p. 90)  . Consistent with their mutual emphasis on the individual 
control of gambling, the Review notes,   ‘Play Safe Limits provide an opportunity for patrons to 
approach Crown Melbourne Limited staff for assistance, if required’ (VCGLR, 2013, p. 91).  
 
It would appear that CCM continue to record patron play data session and spend that is automatically 
recorded, so they would still be aware of whom the big EGM spenders are. The fact that the Operator 
(CCM) does not intervene or shut off play once the limit is reached, considerably weakens the 
efficacy of the program as a problem gambling risk management mechanism. The Review presents 
data supplied by CCM showing that the Play Safe Limits program has had a significant increase from 
approximately 12,500 members in 2010 using it increasing to approximately 37,000 in 2012, but says 
Crown does not know the reasons for the increase and this is not the subject of Review investigation 
(VCGLR, 2013, p. 90).  The Review does not interrogate a matter of some concern that up to 1000 of 
CCM’s 2,500 electronic gambling machines are approved for virtually unrestricted gambling that is 
not subject to state limits designed to protect consumers and that the facility of $100 bank note 
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acceptors and exemption from pay-out by cheque on these machines, renders them at risk of use for 
money laundering purposes.  
 
The Review recognizes money laundering as a risk,  however the detail of the Review does not 
adequately examine the extent to which opportunities (such as unregulated EGMs played under Play 
Safe exemptions) that exist for such activities are being used nor does it explore better means of 
preventing such activities by for example, not allowing such exemptions. This represents a serious 
public interest gap in the Review’s investigation. Of course, that such machines can be played with 
perhaps no player tracking is also a concern that is not addressed by the Review’s recommendation 
that Crown trial player tracking of Signature Club members in VIP rooms .  
4.4. The Review’s assessment of CCM’s Code of Conduct performance  
From 1 June 2009, all gambling licensees in clubs, hotels and the Melbourne Casino are required to 
implement a Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, as required of CCM under section 69 of the 
Casino Control Act 1991. Codes need to comply with the requirements set out in Division 2 of Part 6 
of the Gambling Regulation Act, need approval from the Regulator and must conform to Ministerial 
Guidelines. The Crown Casino RG Code as it will be referred to here, has had three amendments 
approved by the Regulator. 
The latest amendment - not dated but ‘recent’ (VCGLR, 2013, p. 85), modified ‘the observable signs 
of distress’ on which staff receive training to guide their implementation of the Code. The amendment 
as said to draw in particular on Identifying Problem Gamblers in Gambling Venues: Final Report 
(Delfabbro et al. 2007); and Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the 
Gambling Venue (Australian Gaming Council, 2002). The Review also made the observation that 
‘Crown Melbourne Limited’s Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct and general responsible 
gambling intervention framework relies heavily on staff identifying observable signs of distress’ 
(VCGLR, 2013, p. 85).  Below table 1 lists changes to the list of observable signs of distress in Crown 
Melbourne Limited’s Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct. 
 
Table 1. The Review’s outline of Crown Melbourne’s Amended Code of Conduct 
List of observable signs of distress 
PRIOR to amendment 
• Either gambling every day or finding it difficult to stop gambling 
• Gambling for extended periods without a break 
• Avoiding contact while gambling 
• Communicating very little with anyone else 
• Barely reacting to events going on around them 
• Displaying aggressive, antisocial or emotional behaviour while gambling 
• Making requests to borrow money from staff or other customers or continuing to gamble with the 
proceeds of large wins 
 
List of observable signs of distress 
FOLLOWING amendment 
• Self disclosure of a problem with gambling or problems related to gambling 
• Request to self-exclude 
• Distorted and irrational attitudes about gambling 
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• Barely reacting to surrounding events 
• Intolerance to losing, displayed as bad temper or distress 
• Significant variation in mood during a gambling session 
• Children left unattended whilst parent/ guardian gambles 
• Regular complaints to staff about losing or blaming the venue/staff for their losses 
• Requests to borrow money for gambling 
• Showing a pattern of gambling for long periods without a break 
• Progressive reduction of self-care e.g. appearing unkempt or fatigued 
• Requests for assistance from family and/ or friends concerned about aindividual’s gambling 
behaviour (VCGLR, 2013, p. 87; Table 5 [bold added]). 
 
While the Review emphasizes Crown’s reliance on ‘ an accepted and researched premise that 
observable signs are the best indicators of potential problem gambling behaviours’, six of the signs in 
the amended Code (shown in bold above) rely on a communication from the patron or family/friends 
rather than externally observable signs. This is consistent with the CCM promotion of the individual 
control model discussed above and relies on proactive behaviour on the part of the patron (that 
involves some recognition of gambling-related problems and necessitating some interaction with 
staff); rather than the observable signs cited in the research upon which the amendments are 
purportedly based (that of Delfabbro, 2007 and Australian Gambling Council, 2002; shown in 
information box 4 [VCGLR, 2013, p. 86]).  
 
Here we have a situation where the Reviewer is understandably uncritical of the content of a Code, 
which it has already previously approved. In Box 6 (VCGLR, 2013, p. 98), it refers to much more 
specific signs in the New Zealand code but does not undertake a comparative analysis of the amended 
code against what might be considered best practice and against which CCM’s latest Code of Conduct 
compares very poorly.  
 
Is there enforcement of the Code of Conduct? 
To ensure its employees can make an assessment, CCM has developed a Senior Manager Responsible 
Service of Gaming training session for managers and senior floor staff as an additional measure to the 
mandatory Responsible Service of Gaming course that all gaming staff must complete. If a patron 
displays observable signs of distress, Crown Melbourne Limited staff are instructed to contact a 
Responsible Gaming Liaison Officer or the Responsible Gaming Support Centre. There appears to be 
no assessment of whether this system is implemented effectively. 
The crucial question about codes is whether or not they are enforced (OECD, 2012; Monk, 2012). The 
Crown Casino Code of Conduct comes under state provisions making codes mandatory (but free-
form) and approved by the Regulator under general Ministerial Direction (Victorian Commission for 
Gambling Regulation [VCGR], 2009). Under this self-regulatory system, Crown Casino is reliant on 
its workers to know its Code of Conduct and to act as the first link in the chain to effectively identify 
problem gamblers and initiate interventions, albeit in an ‘upward report to supervisor’ model .  
Notably, the Review relies on evidence provided by CCM in its submission, which it does not subject 
to independent review. For such a significant review and only the second in a decade, the lack of 
research specifically conducted for the review is notable. On the matter of staff training on RG, the 
Review is descriptive of routine processes, but has not undertaken its own analysis of the 
effectiveness of training.  It draws extensively on Crown Melbourne Limited’s (2012) submission for 
the evidence on which it draws. On this basis it concludes: 
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Crown Melbourne Limited conducts a formal review for all staff twice a year. As part of this review, 
Crown Melbourne Limited evaluates its staff’s adherence to their Responsible Gambling Code of 
Conduct. Crown Melbourne Limited has advised the VCGLR that since 1 January 2008, the 
performance management system has raised no issues in relation to staff adherence to the Responsible 
Gambling Code of Conduct (VCGR, 2013, p. 85). 
The Review cites evidence from internal Crown Casino surveys of customers and staff in relation to 
the Code, but there is no disclosure of the questions asked, the number of respondents or whether the 
survey was anonymous. In any event, the survey does not specifically test staff awareness or 
implementation of the specific ‘signs of distress’. The questions do not test application of RG or the 
Code or the efficacy of current practices.  
The Review does not engage with counter evidence (Hancock, 2011), where data from 225 Crown 
Casino employees interviewed in their own time via private contacts from the Union, give rare insight 
into problems with the way the Code of Conduct works in practice. Interviewing casino employees 
gives valuable insight into what actually happens ‘on the floor’,  how the Code of Conduct ‘works’ 
and how self-regulation works in practice. Staff reported that financial imperatives often led to 
compromise on implementation of the Code and that the Code was not enforced very well. 
That study also tested casino employees’ understanding and implementation of the Crown Code of 
Conduct [prior to amendment in table 1 above, when the Code had ninesigns of problem gambling 
(shown below). It is also noted that the Code compares unfavourably with the 32 signs of problem 
gambling used in New Zealand and the 20 signs used in Switzerland (Hancock, 2011); and could be 
regarded as minimal in terms of best practice. 
In the study by Hancock (2011), staff indicated inadequate knowledge of the codes they are meant to 
be enforcing. Based on the ‘signs of distress’ of the code prior to amendment (Table 2), questions to 
staff about awareness of code items showed some concerning low levels of awareness of the Code 
they were meant to be implementing. 
Table 2. Crown Casino staff awareness of RG Code ‘signs of distress’ 
Low awareness levels of problem gambling signs by staff 
- 55.6 % ‘communicating very little with anyone else’  
- 59.3 % ‘continuing to gamble with the proceeds of large wins’  
- 61.2% ‘avoiding contact with others while gambling’ 
Mid-level awareness  
- 72.9% ‘barely reacting to events going on around them’ 
- 76.2% ‘gambling every day’ 
- 80.8% ‘gambling for extended periods without a break’ 
Higher level awareness  
-  89.3% ‘displaying aggressive, antisocial or emotional behaviour while gambling’ 
- 92.5% ‘finding it difficult to stop gambling’ and  
- 92.5% ‘making requests to borrow money from staff or other customers’. (Hancock, 2011, p. 
79) 
  
Consistent with the research literature on the ability of gaming venue staff to identify problem 
gambling behaviours (Delfabbro 2007, 2008), almost 70 percent (69.1%) of casino staff in this study 
said they ‘find it easy to identify who the problem gamblers are’ (and an additional 13.5% were 
unsure). However for Codes of Conduct to be effective, they need to identify the right signs and they 
need to be consistently implemented. 
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Staff are trained to report patrons exhibiting signs of problem gambling to supervisors. Apart from the 
fact that knowledge of some of these signs is wanting, the ‘upward report-to-supervisor’ process is 
ambiguous and results in low rates of floor staff interventions in problem gambling – because many 
staff do not follow the Code of Conduct; and some do not see the point as little comes from their 
notifications. Asked why they do not intervene, 71 percent said “ it’s not my place to do it”; 25 
percent said “ I’m not trained to do it” , Twenty-five percent said “I’m told not to” and twelve percent 
said “I am told to wait for a customer to ask for assistance”.  This is despite research cited above, 
confirming that venue staff can reliably identify problem gamblers on the basis of visual and 
behavioural cues. Almost 70% (69.1%) of casino staff in this study said they “find it easy to identify 
who the problem gamblers are”. In the same study: 
• 65.3 percent of casino employee interviewees say they do not advise customers to take regular 
breaks in play.  
• 55.3 percent say they would not intervene when customers are in a distressed state while they are 
playing; and 
• 81.2 percent say they do not approach people they think are having problems with their gambling. 
• 17.6% -answered YES to the statement: “ I sometimes feel under pressured by management to keep 
people gambling” (Hancock, 2011, p. 83). 
 
Commenting on these findings, Canadian Alberta Gambling Research Institute Prof. Garry Smith 
(2012) states: ‘The “regulatory failure” verdict stems from the wilful blindness exhibited by both 
Crown Casino senior management and Victoria regulators. Management, for fostering a corporate 
culture where profit maximization trumps other considerations, including following the Responsible 
Gambling Code of Conduct; and regulators, whose ‘light touch’ oversight allows the Code’s tenets to 
be violated without serious consequence, are the enablers…’ and refers to ‘poorly defined outcomes, 
deficient information gathering, monitoring, and assessment procedures, and the superficial ‘light 
touch’ manner adopted by government regulators’.  
Clearly, Codes of Conduct need both the right ‘signs’ and a culture where risk and problems from 
gambling are seen as preventable and where gambling environments are operated with enforcement of 
host responsibility and a culture that prioritizes responsibility to prevent harms before commercial 
goals.  
4.5 The Review’s RG Recommendations 
The Review found positively on RG: ‘that Crown Melbourne Limited generally has robust and 
detailed systems and processes for dealing with responsible gambling issues and that since 2008, it 
has generally complied with its obligations under the legislation (VCGLR, 2013, p. 93). However a 
number of its recommendations were directed at RG matters.  
 
The Review observed that for better Board oversight and management of RG issues, governance 
structures need improvement to address the fact there are no formal links between the Crown  Board 
and the Crown Limited Responsible Gambling Committee (VCGLR, 2013, p. 93-94). As the Review 
noted: ‘there is no formal consideration of responsible gambling issues by the Crown Melbourne 
Limited Board at its meetings’ (VCGLR, 2013, p. 94). It also recommended trial of player tracking 
using well-established methods used in Canada and approved for use under Auckland Casino’s 
licensing conditions by the New Zealand Regulator. The Review was critical of a paper by Schellinck 
and Schrans (2011) on grounds it was not peer reviewed (although it appeared in a peer reviewed 
journal).  
 
With player tracking analysis now a well-developed technique for interventions on both risk and 
harm, the 18-month time frame for a trial is over-generous (given that player data can be 
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retrospectively dropped into such analysis).The lack of specification on how the program would run 
and be audited, leaves central questions unaddressed. For example, it does not address whether 
patrons found to be experiencing problems would be excluded from gambling, in a manner analogous 
to the provision on not serving intoxicated patrons under liquor licensing laws. In respect of 
preventing minors entering the casino or for detecting self-excluded patrons, the recommendation for 
face recognition technology is long overdue and the 12 month implementation timeframe and absence 
of any requirement for independent evaluation, is overly generous to the Operator. 
 
5. Critiquing the Review 
 
5.1 Critiquing excusatory narratives 
The focus on the competitive Asian gambling market as a key driver of Crown’s growth and the 
interpretation of the local market as ‘mature’ (implying it lacks importance), can be read as directing 
attention to the role of the Review in supporting measures that enable Crown’s growth based on 
growing international markets. This directs attention to the growing and increasingly competitive 
international VIP market (both within Australian casinos and internationally). This positions the 
expenditure on Perth and Melbourne’s Crown Casino refurbishments withn the context of 
international tourism and growth, rather than the impact of casino operations on local communities. 
The Review focus is on the International VIP Asian market to the exclusion of analysis of the 
segmented markets (for example, youth, senior citizens, migrant communities), that contribute to 
CCM’s overall financial performance. In addition to the high roller, private suites and select VIP 
rooms, the main gaming floor attracts local Asian communities to table games, senior citizens in 
particular, to electronic gambling machines and young males, particularly from construction and trade 
industries to sports bars, table games and poker. Local patrons at lower level restricted areas (such as 
Teak Room) requiring loyalty club entry off the main floor, also contribute significantly to revenue 
and are also matters for ‘responsible gambling’ and host responsibility focus. 
Questions raised by the review is whether the Commission uses its powers adequately to formally 
propose conditions upon the licensee or to invoke sanctions is at issue. Under the Casino Control Act 
1991, the Regulator has wide powers to amend the conditions of a licence  under Section 16 
(Amendment of conditions) the Regulator has the power to cancel suspend or vary the license and 
impose fines up to $1 million (Section 20), to give a casino operator written direction that relates to 
the conduct, supervision or control of operations in the casino (Section 23)  and to report its findings 
to the Minister and ‘take whatever action it considers appropriate in the light of its findings’ (Section 
26 (2)) . 
The Regulator thus has wide on-going powers of discretion that can be invoked at any time during 
casino monitoring and not only at the periodic (five-yearly) Reviews. As noted by the Victorian 
Responsible Gambling Foundation ‘ 
The Gambling Regulation Act 2003 is the main piece of legislation governing gambling in Victoria. It 
empowers the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation to set standards for venues 
and machines, to licence companies and venues to provide gambling and to lay down codes of 
conduct and self exclusion tools. Regulations have a role to play in minimizing harm from gambling 
and promoting responsible gambling (RGF, n.d. p. 10). 
 
Interrogating regulatory inspections,the Review relied on the Regulator’s own monitoring data and 
activities/data generated by the Review itself and resourced from within the VCGLR over a nine 
month period. As previously discussed, narrative review is concerned with both inclusions and 
exclusions. The Review gives very little insight into the data it routinely collects or the issues it may 
from time to time take up with CCM . In terms of the Regulator’s monitoring, the Fourth Review 
disclosed that:  
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Commission inspectors are stationed onsite 24 hours a day to monitor gaming activity and Crown 
Melbourne’s compliance with its regulatory obligations. The Commission conducts weekly meetings 
where any issues can be raised and matters addressed as they arise. A Monthly Report of Casino 
Activities is provided to the Commission, which acts on any issues as they become known (VCGA, 
2008, p.2).  
 
Much of the regulatory focus of Casino Inspectors appears to focus on exclusion of minors, gambling 
machine payouts, operational probity of games and tax collection probity, rather than on licensee RG 
and host responsibility obligations. From the available data in the Review and VCGLR annual reports, 
the formal sanctions resulting from casino inspectors’ activities do not seem to draw on the more 
serious end of their wide-ranging powers that include criminal prosecutions, written warnings, and 
disciplinary action.  
 
The lack of research on regulatory enforcement has been noted internationally (Monk 2012; Blanc 
2012). A 2012 OECD workshop report noted:  
(C)onclusions of the workshop confirmed that regulatory enforcement and inspections is a relatively 
new and underestimated element of regulatory policy that has been gaining importance recently. Only 
a few OECD countries have introduced significant cross-cutting reforms in this area, despite the fact 
that there are many opportunities to improve effectiveness and efficiency of inspections and therefore 
regulatory efficiency through better targeting of inspections and making enforcement more outcome-
oriented (OECD, 2012 n.p.).  
Inspectors ‘are often experts without a set of common competencies or frameworks for inspection, 
(T)hey can be influenced by politicians, (P)oor salaries can lead to corrupt behaviour, (P)erformance 
targets can lead to perverse incentives (OECD, 2012 n.p.).  
The main thrust of the OECD work in this area is that regulatory inspections play a crucial role in the 
regulatory governance cycle, inspectorial delivery needs to be based on assessments of risk and 
evidence, performance should be assessed against clear benchmarks, ‘Inspection authorities should be 
able to clearly demonstrate that they are truly independent from political interference’ (OECD, 2012).  
This raises a number of questions: 
 
- how do Reviews inform on-going monitoring of Crown Casino in light of the findings of previous 
Reviews, of legislative changes and the findings of inquiries into gambling and evolving evidence 
base on the impact of gambling and of gambling operations involved in sale of liquor? 
- are the timelines for VCGLR recommendations overly generous, given the issues at stake and the 
late implementation of well-developed technology such as face recognition, crowd assessment and 
casino player tracking technologies? 
- transparency - will CCM’s responses to recommendations from the VCGLR be publicly reported 
and made public or will the public have to wait until the next Review in 2018? 
- do the biases and omissions in the Review merit independent audit by the Auditor General or other 
independent statutory third party with regard to an overhaul of the regulatory process and attention to 
conflict of interest? 
- should the methods of the Review be overhauled, given the questions raised as to the adequacy of 
the VCGLR routine practices in oversight of RG and RSA at CCM? 
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6. Conclusion 
With the NSW State Government giving the go-ahead for a new Crown casino license in Sydney 
CBD and the Queensland government announcing its consideration of extending its casinos to seven, 
the issue of social impact of casinos and how they are licensed, monitored, regulated and reviewed, 
brings up crucial governance, probity and public interest issues. Although governments have 
expressed a focus on harm minimization and ‘responsible gambling’, concerns about problem 
gambling, and (in some States) public health approaches to harm prevention, the dominant prevailing 
approach is one of individual blame for problem gambling impacts and a lack of focus on governance 
system surrounding the safety of gambling products (especially electronic gambling machines and 
automated table games), and the safety of gambling environments characterized by industry self-
regulation via unmonitored Codes of Conduct on Responsible Gambling and a lack of emphasis on 
consumer protection from preventable harms related to gambling and gambling environments. Within 
this mix, gambling regulators tend to focus on tax collection probity, gambling machine pay-outs and 
perfunctory rule compliance, rather than  regulation for safe and sustainable gambling. 
Current discourses on ‘problem gambling’ and ‘responsible gambling’ are bounded within an 
individualized informed consumer model, that draws on medicalized typifications of individual 
pathology. As Bacchi argues, the ‘problem gambler paradigm’ (demand for gambling) precludes 
examination of the complex reasons why people gamble and supply factors related to production, 
packaging and promotion of gambling. It precludes examination of inequitable power relations that 
underpin gambling-related transactions (Bacchi, 2007 p. 91, 89). Recent research on addiction help-
seeking has found that problem gambling is treated as a moral failing, whereas drug or alcohol 
addiction are regarded more sympathetically than gambling (Jean, 2013). Such typifications of ‘the 
problem’ as one of individual weakness divert attention from the responsibility of the State in 
regulating gambling as a dangerous consumption.  
 
As argued by Gerda Reith (2008, p. 150-151) responsibility is focused on the individual gambler 
(seen as having freedom and choice) rather than the responsibility of State regulation. This, she 
argues, reflects the shift under neo liberalism away from production-side issues (supply, availability, 
accessibility of products) towards the consumption side (individual consumers with choices, freedoms 
and habits). Similarly, Cosgrave & Klassen (2009, p. 60) critique ‘responsible gambling’ as ‘neo 
liberal individualism used rhetorically to obscure the reality of industry (and governments’) priority 
on profit maximisation’. They argue that ‘anyone is at risk of gambling irresponsibly’.  
 
A consumer protection and public health lens exposes the bounded rationality of dominant discourses 
on ‘responsible gambling’ as the servant of industry and government profit maximization. Underlying 
current priorities is a callous acceptance of harm to a predicable but significant group of mainly 
regular gamblers; who are quite frequently also drawn from some of the most vulnerable groups in the 
community. This is at the expense of precautionary risk aversion, early prevention, safer products and 
improved safety within gambling environments; that are now within easy reach for governments with 
the will to implement.  
 
Governments are beholden to the gambling industry to raise much-needed taxes that contribute 
substantially to revenue (nationally in Australia at about ten percent of State/Territory revenues and 
about 12-13 percent in Victoria). When the Regulator is responsible both for day-to-day casino 
monitoring as well as periodic reviews of the licence, it is to a great extent, relying on its own, rather 
than third party or independent data, which represents a clear conflict of interest and potential 
compromise of the Review process. This is clearly in contravention of recent critiques of regulatory 
enforcement highlighted by the OECD (2012; Monk, 2012; Cary 2012) and of the Victorian 
Government’s own policy as articulated in Improving Governance of Regulators: Principles and 
Guidelines. 
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